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International Trade, Migration and Unemployment – The Role of Informal 
Sector  
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper provides an elaborate general equilibrium framework by including informal 
economic activities in a model of trade, migration and unemployment. Existence of 
informal activities is critical in generating positive employment effects of liberal trade 
policies. Following a tariff cut informal wage increases and rate of unemployment goes 
down under reasonable conditions. Next we generalize the benchmark model to 
capture the phenomenon of sequential migration: from agriculture to urban informal 
sector, and then to urban formal sector. The paper also extends the benchmark model to 
include both informal intermediate and final good. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper starts with a popular saying that good news is hardly any news and bad 
news is all that counts. Effect of reformatory policies on development in general and 
employment in particular is such an issue that has been generating a never-ending 
debate among economists, policy makers since the time trade liberalization was 
initiated. Overall impact of any economic policy should be judged by its entirety which 
partial equilibrium analysis is incapable of. Partial effects often give us gloomy picture 
and create “bad news” while the overall scenario could be a better one and can create 
“good news if properly reported”. Typically this thing happens when tariff goes down 
following trade liberalization and people lose jobs in the import-competing sector. On 
the other hand, the exportable sector may expand and the total employment may, in 
fact, go up. If the second outcome is not reported, good side of the story remains untold. 
Therefore, here we take up a general equilibrium model of trade to focus on both 
“good” and “bad” news to do an impartial assessment of effectiveness of any 
reformatory policy. In the existing, relatively recent literature, it has been demonstrated 
that in case of India, which initiated pro-market reforms in the early 90s, real informal 
wage in the unorganized manufacturing sector had gone up across all states, without 
exception. In this paper we focus on open urban employment, intersectoral capital 
mobility and alternative activities of the informal sector and argue that under 
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reasonable conditions a cut in tariff will raise informal wage and reduce rate of 
unemployment. 
Sarkar (1989), Beladi and Marjit (1996), Marjit and Beladi (2003), Chao & Yu (1995, 
2001), and Fields (2005) etc. are some interesting papers in the existing literature that 
talks about possible employment effects. Sarkar (1989) argued how in a Keynesian 
model trade definitely leads to more unemployment if the economy suffers from 
effective demand constraints. Other papers used variants of H-T model to look at the 
effect of trade policies on open unemployment. On the other hand, in an interesting 
paper Gupta (1997) introduced informal sector in H-T model1. But the urban informal 
wage in such models is less than the rural wage, as expected urban wage has to be 
equal to the rural wage and the urban formal wage is greater than the rural wage.  
But casual empiricism suggests that in the developing world there is a fair bit of 
mobility between the urban informal sector and the rural sector.  So we assume that 
workers get the same wage in both sectors. The urban informal sector draws labor 
from the rural sector and capital from the urban formal sector. Such mobility assigns a 
pivotal role to the informal sector. The way we set up the model allows workers to 
choose between working in the informal sector or going back to the rural sector and of 
course the choice of “waiting” in the pool of unemployed.  
                                                 
1
 Two interesting papers by Banerjee and Newman (1995, 1998) need special mention. They primarily emphasized 
how migration, leads to development and thereby integrate different parts of the country or world through migration 
process. 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirically  the  significance  of  the  urban  informal  sector  has  been  understood  
in  many papers. Agenor (1996) provides  an  elegant  survey  on  the  size  of  
informal  sectors  in developing countries. By quoting numerous studies, informal 
labor force accounts for more than 90% of total labor force.  Segmented labor markets 
and implications of development policies in such a set-up have been analyzed in 
Agenor and Montiel (1996). Drawing on earlier papers by Agenor and Montiel (1996), 
Marjit (2003), Agenor (2005) and Marjit, Kar and Beladi (2007) looked at the possibility 
of arising informal wage and employment when laid off workers from the formal 
sector crowd into the informal sector2. Marjit and Kar (2011) is an interesting 
compilation of a reasonably good number of papers in this line of research. But 
somehow employment effect of trade policy in a standard HT structure with an 
informal sector is largely absent in the literature. 
In our framework a decline in tariff reduces open unemployment through 
expansion of employment in the informal sector and an increase in the informal wage. 
The result is an outcome of having a labor intensive urban informal sector and 
allowing capital to move between the formal and the informal sector. It is more simple 
and general than the earlier work of Beladi and Marjit (1996) which brings in an 
                                                 
2
 Though recent literature on migration, informal sector and development economics has changed to a significant 
extent, the basic arguments of major research revolves around H-T set up. Some notable articles in such line are 
Fields (2009), Gerxhani (2004), Chen (2005), Gang and Gangopadhyay (1987), Stark (1991), Rauch (1991), Meng 
(2001), Haan (2000), Olesen (2002), Skeldon (2008), Haas (2010) etc. 
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intermediate input in the HT structure together employment reducing effect of 
protection. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Second section discusses the benchmark model 
and the equilibrium. This section also deals with the impact of a tariff when the 
informal is a traded sector. In this backdrop we also check what happens to 
unemployment in absence of informal sector.In section 3 we attempt to 
generalize the benchmark model with the notion of sequential migration 
where people cannot directly move from rural to urban formal sector. And 
hence they need to be absorbed in urban informal sector as a stop gap 
arrangement. But the prevailing wage rates in rural and urban informal 
sector are not identical, which is a conventional starting point of this kind of 
research.Thenext section presents an extended version of the benchmark model to 
focus on the role of capital mobility. In doing so we introduce two different types of 
capital and two informal sectors where one produces an intermediate input and the 
other produces a final good.The last section provides some concluding remarks. 
However, relevant mathematical details are provided in the Appendix.  
2.The BenchmarkModel and Solutions 
There are three goods X (urban formal manufacturing good), Y (urban informal 
good), and A (the agricultural good) produced in the neo-classical framework using 
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three factors such as labor (L) and two types of capital (K and T). K is perfectly mobile 
across X and Y but T is specific to A. Labor is freely mobile between Y and Z, in the 
sense that workers earn the same wage, W-informal wage in both these sectors. But X 
offers a wage   formal wage which is determined through negotiation between 
producers and labor with the unions.3 To motivate on H-T kind of migration 
equilibrium we further assume that there is open unemployment i.e. the workers 
migrating from the rural to the urban are a can either hang around unemployed 
waiting for a formal job which gives  > or they can get W either in the urban 
informal sector or in the rural sector. So they are basically indifferent between urban 
informal sector and rural sector. K moves freely between the urban formal and 
informal sectors earning the same return,r, whereas T gets R as return.  
We also assume that X is an import-competing good protected by tariff, t. On 
the other hand, Y,  the informal manufacturing sector is assumed to produce a traded 
good. The agricultural good, A is an export good. The country concerned is a small 
one, so commodity prices are determined in the international market.  
The symbols and basic equations are in consistence with Jones (1965). To build 
the system of equations, we use following notations: 
                                                 
3In this paper we would be using a variant of Harris-Todaro (H-T) structure with Jonesian (’65, ’71) 
general equilibrium structures of Heckscher-Ohlin and Specific Factors model of trade. 
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Pi = Price of ith good, i = X, Y, A;  = Return to labor in the formal sector; = Return to 
labor in the informal sector; r = Return to capital, K; = Technological co-efficient; = 
Total supply of capital K; 	= Total supply of labor; 
	= Total supply of capital T; 
U=Unemployment rate. 
Competitive commodity market guarantees the following equalities:  
  +   = 1 +        (1) 
 +   =         (2) 
 +   =         (3)  
Note that,   > . 
Full employment conditions ensure the following:  .  = 
	         (4)  .  + .  =         (5) 
T andK are inelastic supplies of land and capital.    
H-T migration equilibrium condition yields 
 =   !"#	$ %&' ()        (6) 
Therefore full employment condition for L can be written as  
  +  +  = 	       (6a)4 
Let us now define U as unemployment or rate of unemployment as a ratio of number of 
unemployed people to the number of people seeking employment in X. Therefore,  
                                                 
4 =  
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* = 1 −  !"#	$ %&' ()         (7) 
Plugging (6) into (7) 
* = 1 −            (7a) 
This completes the structure of the model. Now let us solve for the unknown 
variables. Given t and small country assumption we solve r, W and R from (1), (2) and 
(3) respectively. All s are determined via CRS and DMP assumptions. Therefore A is 
calculated from the full employment condition of T. (5) and (6a) determine X and Y, and 
U is determined from (7a). Thus the model is solved. 
2.A.  The Basic Result 
Following liberalized trade policy t goes down. This pushes down r since L is unionized 
and gets a pre-determined wage  . The exact effect is shown as ( a ‘hat’ over a variables 
represents proportional change) 
̂ = -.! ̂          (8)5 
̂ < 0as̂ < 0 and 1 is the value share of K in X. In this backdrop we will consider two 
cases: one where urban informal sector (Y) is present in the system in contrast to the 
alternative situation where the economy is devoid of the informal sector. 
Case-I: Y exists 
                                                 
51 is the value share of ith factor in jth commodity where i=K, L, T and j= X, Y, A 
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2 = − -.%- % -.! ̂ > 0       (9) 
Informal wage goes up following a decline in t because even when r falls  does 
not change as Y is a traded good and the country is a small one. This causes an increase 
in W. Again when W goes up R must fall as  is also given. 
3 = -4(- ( -.%- % -.! ̂ < 0         (10) 
When return to T falls, people uses T more intensively. Hence with a given T, A must 
contract. At the same time L-constraint becomes less binding and K-constraint becomes 
more binding as both 56 7 and 56 7 go up indicating relatively less utilization of L per  
 Y 
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Figure-1 
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unit of X and Y. Therefore, depending on the factor intensity comparison between X 
and Y, different sectors would expand or contract. Conventionally X is K-intensive and 
Y is L-intensive. So X would fall and Y would inflate. This is described in the above 
figure (Figure-1). KK and LL are the original K-constraint and L-constraint respectively 
pointing at equilibrium at E. When r falls,   and  increase and  and  fall. 
New constraints would be K’K’ and L’L’. Even though K-constraint shifts down 
parallely, L-constraint would not shift up parallely as 56 78 > 56 78 . It would be more like 
an anti-clockwise rotation. So the new equilibrium would be at E’ implying higher Y 
and lower X. 
 Algebraically, 
9 = : - (-.! -.%- % 5-4($- (- ( 7 ̂        (11)6 
Naturally, 1 > 1 ; 9 < 0 since ̂ < 0. 
Differentiating (5) and (6a) and using (11) one can easily check that the value of 3 and 3  
is primarily determined by factor intensity ranking. Interested readers can find the 
detailed calculation in the Appendix. 
3 = ;.%|;| -.%- % ̂ =; !-.! − : - (-.! ; (- ( 1 − 1>3 = ;.!|;| -.%- % ̂ =: - (-.! ; (- ( 1 − 1 − ; !-.!>?     (12)7 
                                                 
6:is the elasticity of substitution in A. 
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X will fall and Y will increase unambiguously if X is capital intensive which is a 
reasonable assumption, given that Y is considered to be the informal sector. 
 Now let us move to the focal point of the paper – effect on unemployment rate. 
Equation (7) yields 
@* =  -.! -.%- % ̂         (13) 
It is apparent from (13) that @* < 0 due to a tariff cut. Note that, the effect on * is 
independent of factor intensity assumptions of X, Y, and A. 
Case-II: Y does not exist 
 A reduction in t also reduces r in this case like the situation when we had Y. 
Consequent upon a decrease in r,  must go up and hence X must shrink. This will 
release L and they will rush to A pushing down W. Therefore,  * = 1 −    will increase. 
Note that Y represented the urban informal sector, and it expanded. The set up that we 
consider in Case-II resembles a structure where capital cannot move between X and A. 
So it can also be conceived as a case of capital immobility8. 
Hence we propose that: 
                                                                                                                                                             
7Ais the employment share of ith factor in jth commodity where i=K, L, T and j= X, Y, A. |A| is the factor 
employment share matrix for X and Y where |A| > 0 means X is K-intensive and conversely if |A| < 0. 
 
8
 The capital was also immobile in Case-I. We will discuss the issue of capital immobility in a more complicated and 
extended structure in the next section. 
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PROPOSITION I: Liberal trade policy leads to a decline in the rate of unemployment 
irrespective of factor intensity ranking, if Y exists.    ∎ 
However, if X and A use same capital unlike the benchmark model, a fall in t 
induces W to rise. Hence * = 1 −   must fall. This indicates that capital mobility does 
not matter much if Y exists. In both cases U falls due tariff cut. But in absence of urban 
informal sector@* takes different value under two different capital mobility 
assumptions. Thus it seems that capital mobility among sectors is also very critical in 
determining as to what happens to unemployment rate owing to trade liberalization. 
Therefore, in section 4 we attempt to emphasize on the role of capital mobility in an 
economy characterized by unemployment and migration. 
3. Generalizing the Benchmark Model with Sequential Migration 
In this section we strive to reflect on more real world like phenomenon where 
people cannot migrate directly from agriculture (A) to urban formal sector (X). They 
come to urban informal sector (Y) first and then search for jobs there. So, in a sense it 
could be pseudo unemployment that we measure as unemployment. Though influx of L 
in Y pushes down C, and pull up D. We will explain the reasons later. But free 
mobility of L between Y and A has a tendency to equate C and D if there is no other 
compromising element. So, people migrate from A to Y, and next move is from Y to X. 
This behavior is termed as sequential migration since L moves sequentially. In the first 
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phase of movement we do not have any unemployment related to migration due to 
bidirectional adjustment possibility in C. Migration related unemployment 
phenomenon, however, is present in the second phase as migrated people try to get 
employed in X where wage adjustment is not possible. Hence we get a probabilistic 
wage determination framework for informal as well as agricultural sector. Even if the 
argument seems akin to H-T set up, our model is significantly different from H-T 
primarily because of two reasons. H-T does not consider the presence of informal sector 
which remarkably absorbs unemployment problems, and migration is a two-step 
mechanism. Both these features are quite universal and thus our set up resembles 
reality better than H-T. Hence equation (1)-(3) of the benchmark model becomes: 
  +   = 1 +        (1) 
C +   =         (2’) 
D +   =         (3’)  
Again, when people move from A to Y, they do not receive wage equal to C. There 
could be various reasons for such an outcome. Unless, one has some network in the 
urban informal sector through kinship, friends etc. it is very difficult to find a place in 
Y.9 Moving out of A, and settling in Y afresh also requires some establishment cost. On 
                                                 
9
 Network economics has become an integral part of migration theory. Earlier papers starting with Stark and Bloom 
(1985), Montgomery (1991), Neto and Mullet (1998), and then some recent contributions by Manski (2000), Munshi 
(2011), Mishra (2007),  Pedersen et al (2008),  Armengol and Jackson (2007) provide sufficient support in favor of 
the argument that network influences migration. 
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the other hand, in order to create new network, either they require some cost or need to 
remain work-less for the first couple of days or weeks or months when they do not earn 
but spend. This implies a cost that they must take into account while comparing Cand 
D. Cost may also be incurred if the migrant has to commute before finding out a place 
of residence near to the work place. All these factors, essentially, discount the wage he 
receives from Y. The cost, however, is always a decreasing function of the size of the 
urban informal workforce through network effect. The bigger is the size of network 
E = F, the chance of being employed very quickly, goes up, and thus reduces the 
discount value accounting for cost of migration. Hence, D approaches to C. Therefore,  
D = GC        (14) 
Gis the discount rate or cost of migration and re-settlement. 0 < G ≤ 1and GI > 0. 
Also,  > C > D. 
When G = 1, we will, essentially, end up with standard H-T kind of structure 
that clearly explained in the benchmark model. So, benchmark model is a special case of 
the generalized version. 
Following the procedure used before, 
C =   !"#	$#%'#(         (15) 
And * = 1 −  !"#	$ %&' ()          
Or, * = 1 − J          (16) 
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* inversely depends only on C. So in our analysis, the primary variable of interest 
is C that will inject change in *. 
Full employment conditions are  
.  = 
	         (17)  .  + .  =         (18) J  +  +  = 	        (19) 
Given t, r is determined from (1) and C is solved from (2’). So for any given value of 
, D is derived from (14) and (3’) solves R. In what follows, A is solved from (17). 
Equation (18) and (19) together give X and Y. Eventually (15) solves . Nevertheless, 
for such , we need to solve for  , that we assumed as given while solving for D. 
Equation (15) can be re-written as  
 +  = 	C −  C  
So, when  goes up,  must fall for any give values of X and C. This indicates a 
negative relation between and . 
Again from (14), when  increases, G also goes up indicating an increase in the 
RHS of (14). To bring back equality in (14) D has to rise, insisting a fall in  for any 
determined value of X. Therefore,  and  are again negatively related for equation 
(14). These are shown in Figure-2. Values of  and  are simultaneously solved from 
the intersection of AA and BB. Note that,  adjusts along BB, and  adjusts along AA. 
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This indicates stability of the equilibrium depicted in Figure-2. Thus the generalized 
model is solved for all the unknown variables.  
     B (from (14)) 
   A        
  
  
     
     
        
 
         A  (from (15)) 
      B 
      
      O            
Figure-2 
 
In this back drop, following tariff reform, return to K falls as in the benchmark 
model. ̂ = -.! ̂ < 0. In absence of Y the notion of sequential migration does not arise at 
all. So, we focus only on the set up where informal sector exists. Owing to a fall in r, 
return to unskilled wage in Y must go up: 2C = − -.%- % -.! ̂ > 0. Therefore, it is 
apparent from (16) that U will decrease. 
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Again, D = GC  implies  
2D = GLEF + 2C . 
For any value of GEF < 1, our story holds the essence of sequential migration. 
When GEF = 1, for any critical value of  such as M  we have H-T framework which 
is explained in the benchmark model. So without any loss of generality we assume 
 < M , and 0 < GEF < 1. For sake of brevity we further assume q as constant. Thus, 
2D = 2C 
Hence, @* = − J 2C = 2J -.! -.%- % ̂ < 0. This result is identical with what we have 
in Proposition I of the benchmark model. 
Now, we move to the output front. When r falls, X must shrink due to the fact that X 
and Y in isolation form Heckscher-Ohlin subset, and X is capital intensive. Consequent 
upon this L will move out of X and rush to either Y or A. So, E + F must increase. 
This is also corroborated from (15). An increase in Ccan be equated with the RHS of 
(15) if the following condition holds: 
N O N < N	 −  + O N 
Thus it is insured that,  E + F has to rise. We may have three different situations in 
this backdrop. 
(I) 3 = 0  and 3 > 0 
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(II) 3 > 0  and 3 = 0 
(III) 3 > 0  and 3 > 0 
However, there may be some other possibilities as well where either  or  fall and 
the other rises in such a fashion that E + F rises as a whole. This argument will 
make the story unnecessarily complicated, so we will rule out this and try to intuitively 
explain the three options mentioned to argue which one is reasonable and consistent 
with the results derived.  
Motivated by tariff cut, r drops. Reduction in r pulls up C. As argued before, D 
will also increase in tandem with C. This pushes R down. T, being a specific factor, 
explains why A should fall. Hence some L will be released from A, and they have only 
one sector to fall back on. So, eventually  decreases and  goes up (consistent with 
option (I)) to ensure that only Y will expand following liberalization. 
 
4.  Extending the Benchmark Model with Capital (im)mobility 
 Keeping the essence of the benchmark model of the previous section intact we 
include an informal sector producing intermediate input (M) that is used in one of the 
formal segmentsD. Besides, formal and informal segments use different types of 
capital vizC and D respectively. So we have two formal goodsC, D.  , two informal 
goods (M, Y) and one agricultural output (A). 
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 Extended system of equation is 
 C +  CJC = C1 +        (1E) 
 D +  CJD + PPD = D      (2E) 
P + DQP = P       (3E) 
 + DQ =         (4E) 
 +   =         (5E)  
Full employment conditions are: 
.  = 
	         (6E) 
JC . C + JD . D = C			       (7E) 
P.  +  .  = D			        (8E) 
P.  = R         (9E) 
H-Tmigration equilibriumsuggests 
 =  E !J ."J' !Q ."QF#	$ %&' ST ' ()       (10E) 
And the unemployment rate is again defined as 
* = 1 −            (11E) 
 Immobility of capital between formal and informal segments invokes the issue of 
non-identical return to capital in two segments of the economy which is quite 
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prominent across the globe. So here we have two types of informal sectors: one 
produces final output Y; and other sub-section produces intermediate input, M. 
 Now let us look at the effect of reduction in t 
CU = -.J!J ̂ < 0        (12E) 
Unlike the benchmark model, a fall in the return to C immediately affects Pas Dis 
constant. 
3P = − -.J!J -.J!Q-S! ̂ > 0       (13E) 
When P goes up, a round of Stolper-Samuelson arguments goes around the 
Heckscher-Ohlin informal segments. Factor returns change following factor intensity 
comparison between M and Y. Simple mathematical manipulation a la Jones (’65, ’71) 
gives 
2 = − C|-| -.%-.J!J -.J!Q-S! ̂       (14E)10 
(14E) delineates that the value of  2  crucially depends on |1|. So when M is labor-
intensive (capital-intensive), 2 > 0 2 < 0. Consequently U decreases (increases). It 
can be insured from (11E). Thus we propose that: 
PROPOSITION II: Even if there is no mobility of capital a decline in t must reduce U iff 
M is labor-intensive. 
 
                                                 
10|1| is the value share matrix for M and Y where |1| > 0 means M is L-intensive and conversely if |1| < 0 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof: See discussion above. 
 
Now think of a situation where M is used in C instead of D. It is obvious that a 
decline in t under such situation would reduce P. In that case, U will fall iff Y is labor-
intensive (unlike Proposition II). 
Thus it is clear that immobility of capital is not at all critical when informal 
intermediates are used in final good and we have supporting intensity ranking. Note 
that if informal segment was totally missing, U could never go down. 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper we attempted to check a general apprehension if trade liberalization 
enhances or reduces unemployment. In the basic set up it has been proved that 
liberalization policy reduces unemployment if capital is mobile across sectors. We have, 
then, generalized the basic model to introduce more realistic pattern of migration which 
exhibits a sequential pattern, and validated the focal point of the benchmark model. 
However, in absence of informal sector capita mobility turns out to be critical in the 
basic set up. So in an extended model we further tested as to whether capital mobility 
really matters. And we showed that capital mobility is not so crucial in reducing 
unemployment. Rather the factor intensity ranking is a significant determinant of 
unemployment in the post-liberalized phase. We further proved that unemployment 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
must go up in absence of informal segment. These arguments are valid in both the 
benchmark and extended model. 
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Appendix 
Output effect in the Benchmark model 
From (5) and (6a) 
A3 + A3 = 0 
A3 + A3 = 11 ̂ V: 11 A1 1 − 1 − A1W 
Cramer’s rule helps determining the equilibrium values of  3 and 3  as 
3 = A|A| 11 ̂ VA1 − : 11 A1 1 − 1W3 = A|A| 11 ̂ V: 11 A1 1 − 1 − A1WXYY
YZ
 
Where, |A| = [AAAA [ 
|A| > 0if X is capital-intensive. 
Unambiguously, 3 < 0 and 3 > 0iff  1 < 1. However, even if 1 > 1 X may fall 
and Y may go up under certain condition. Since our focal point is not the expansion or 
contraction of X and Y we do not focus on such alternative conditions.  
(Un)employment effect Output effect in the Benchmark model 
Unemployment rate in the basic set up is defined as= 1 −   . Differentiating this what 
we get @* = − \. Q = −2  .  
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